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COMMENT
THE SPECTRUM SCARCITY DOCTRINE:

A

CONSTITUTIONAL ANACHRONISM
by Murray J. Rossini

HE spectrum scarcity doctrine constitutionally justifies extensive
governmental regulation of the broadcast media.' The doctrine, first
adopted by the Supreme Court in 19332 and recently perpetuated in
1984, 3 assumes that the absence of regulation would result in a crowded
chaos of signals within the limited electromagnetic spectrum. 4 The doctrine
further assumes that regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum ensures that
the few recipients of broadcast licenses will use this scarce national resource
in the public interest.5 Because of the special justification provided by the
doctrine, almost all federal regulations of the broadcast media would consti6
tute an abridgement of the first amendment if applied to print media.
This Comment finds the spectrum scarcity doctrine unjustified in light of
current technology. 7 Broadcasting technology has developed rapidly with
the advent and expanded use of cable television and communications satel1. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTINDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 894-902 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK]; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 698
(1978).
2. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279
(1933). The Supreme Court cited this case as authority for the spectrum scarcity doctrine in
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3116, 82 L. Ed. 2d 278, 289 (1984); however, commentators have not discussed Nelson Brothers in conjunction with the doctrine.
3. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3116-17, 82 L. Ed. 2d 278, 289-90
(1984), discussed infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
4. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969).
5. Id. at 391-400.
6. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3116-17, 82 L. Ed. 2d 278, 289-90
(1984); see L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 700; Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New Media"--New Directions in Regulating Telecommunications, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 201, 202-03

(1979).
7. At least two authors have argued that the spectrum scarcity model has always portrayed an inaccurate picture of the broadcasting medium. See I. DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 151 (1983); Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcasting
Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 207, 221-22 (1982). Other works criticizing the spectrum scarcity doctrine include E. DIAMOND, N. SANDLER & M. MUELLER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN
CRISIS: THE FIRST AMENDMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND DEREGULATION 9-12 (1983) [herein-

after cited as E. DIAMOND]; Bazelon, supra note 6, at 207; Fowler, Forward, 32 CATH. U.L.
REV. 523-28 (1983); Goldberg & Couzens, "PeculiarCharacteristics":An Analysis of the First
Amendment Implicationsof Broadcast Regulation, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 1, 29 (1978); Powe, "Or
of the [Broadcast]Press," 55 TEX. L. REV. 39, 57 (1976).
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lites. 8 Television indisputably constitutes an important source of information in the United States. Whether measured in terms of economic 9 or
social ° influence, television broadcasting pervades society.
This Comment traces the historical development of the spectrum scarcity
doctrine, briefly outlines the development and application of new broadcast
technologies, and criticizes the doctrine in light of these recent technological
developments. In particular, this Comment focuses on several developments
in television technology and the incongruity between the availability of channels and the doctrine of spectrum scarcity. Finally, this Comment discusses
two suggestions for reform of the system of broadcasting regulation. One
proposal, a market approach, would make broadcast licenses freely transferable. Another suggestion, a structural approach, would enhance diversity by
limiting the concentration of ownership in the television delivery system."
I.

JUDICIAL ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE

A.

HistoricalBackground

The spectrum scarcity doctrine presently supports regulation of various
forms of broadcasting media. 12 At its inception the doctrine justified only
the regulation of radio.' 3 Before 1927 federal statutes controlled ship radio

traffic 14 and required a broadcaster to obtain a license from the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor.1 5 In 1926 the government possessed no statutory au16
thority for restrictions on frequency use, power, and hours of operation.
The lack of regulations led to chaos in the radio industry. 17 New stations
used any frequency they pleased, and existing stations changed frequencies
and increased their power at will. 18 The Radio Act of 1927 attempted to
control frequency usage.19 The Act created the Federal Radio Commission
8. See generally E. DIAMOND, supra note 7, at 21-49 (discussing various technological
advances in broadcasting); Stem, Krasnow & Senkowski, The New Video Marketplace and the
Searchfor a Coherent Regulatory Philosophy, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 529, 532-61 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Stem] (reviewing innovations in video services).
9. In 1980 gross revenues from the broadcast industry exceeded 10 billion dollars. U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1984, at 561.
10. Television viewing averaged over 23 hours per home per week in the United States in
February 1983. NATIONAL ASS'N OF BROADCASTERS, BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING
YEARBOOK 1984, at G-16.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 141-46.
12. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3116-17, 82 L. Ed. 2d 278,
289-90 (1984); Bazelon, supra note 6, at 203.
13. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943) (limited
radio spectrum made Radio Act of 1927 necessary); 73 F.C.C.2d 497, 500 (brief history of
early history of radio regulation); I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 7, at 113-16.
14. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210 (1943).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 212. In 1926 an Illinois district court held that the Secretary of Commerce and
Labor had no power to regulate radio. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 618
(N.D. Ill. 1926); see also I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 7, at 113 (history of need for broadcast
regulation in 1930s).
17. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
18. Id.
19. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162-74 (current version at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 81-121 (1976)).
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and empowered it with wide-ranging regulatory powers. 20 The Communications Act of 1934 incorporated the basic provisions of the Radio Act of
1927.21

B.

The Origin of the Judicial Doctrine of Broadcast Spectrum Scarcity

The Supreme Court initially addressed the issue of first amendment protection of broadcasters in National BroadcastingCo. v. United States.22 The
case included a challenge to a regulation promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) under the authority of the Communications
Act of 1934. Specifically, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) challenged the FCC's chain broadcasting regulations that prohibited certain
marketing practices 23 of the large radio networks. At this time NBC and
Columbia Broadcasting Systems together controlled eighty-five percent of
the total nighttime radio voltage. 24 The chain broadcasting regulations prohibited the exclusive affiliation of a radio station with one network and one
which such ownership
network's ownership of two radio stations in areas in
25
resulted in a substantial restriction of competition.
Noting the FCC's statutory authority to make special regulations applicable to radio chain broadcasting 26 and Congress's intent to safeguard the public interest by enacting the Communications Act of 1934,27 the Court
rejected the first amendment attack on the chain broadcasting regulations on
first amendment grounds. 28 The Court held that because not all of those
who desired a broadcasting license could be accommodated, a denial of a
license did not constitute a denial of free speech. 29 This30holding laid the
theoretical foundation for the spectrum scarcity doctrine.
20. The Act empowered the Commission to classify radio stations, prescribe services to be
rendered by each class, assign bands and frequencies, and make regulations necessary to carry
out provisions of the Act. Id. § 4.
21. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)).
22. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
23. The regulations sought to correct eight network practices that tended to perpetuate
control in the two major broadcasters, CBS and NBC. The practices included (1) exclusive
affiliation of stations; (2) territorial exclusivity; (3) a long term of affiliation; (4) options of the
networks over local air time; (5) ineffective rights of local stations to reject network programs;
(6) network ownership of stations; (7) dual network operation; and (8) the control by networks
of station rates. Id. at 198-208.
24. Id. at 198.
25. See supra note 23.
26. 319 U.S. at 215.
27. Id. The FCC's basic philosophy underlying chain broadcasting regulations states that
due to the naturally limited number of radio channels, those persons who have licenses must
put their channels to the most effective use. Id. at 218.
28. Id. at 226.
29. Id. at 226-27. Several commentators have identified this section of the National
Broadcasting Co. holding as the key language on the spectrum scarcity doctrine. See J. NoWAK, supra note 1, at 895; Goldberg & Couzens, supra note 7, at 26; Powe, supra note 7, at 45.
Although commentators have chosen the language in this part of the holding, the FCC's basic
philosophy stated in note 27 supra presents a clearer statement of the Court's holding.
30. See J. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 895; Goldberg & Couzens, supra note 7, at 26.
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C. Modern Development of the Doctrine

Although the court recognized federal power to regulate broadcast media
in National BroadcastingCo., the Court did not fully consider the extent of
the government's regulatory authority until Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
Federal Communications Commission. 31 In Red Lion the Court employed

32
the spectrum scarcity doctrine to uphold the general fairness doctrine.
The fairness doctrine requires radio stations to offer free reply time to persons individually attacked and for rebuttals to political editorials aired by
33
the station.

Red Lion challenged the fairness doctrine, alleging that the rules abridged

34
its first amendment right to use its radio frequency in any way it wished.
The Court rejected this argument, finding that nothing in the first amendment prohibited the government from requiring a broadcaster to share its
frequency with others and to conduct itself as a fiduciary for the public by
broadcasting views representive of those in its community. 35 Justice White,
writing for the Court, rejected Red Lion's argument that modern technology
provided many more radio frequencies, eliminating the need for government
regulations requiring broadcasters to serve the public interest. 36 Thus, in

1969 the Court reaffirmed the spectrum scarcity doctrine as the theoretical
37
justification for the Communications Act of 1934.
In 1984 the Supreme Court perpetuated the doctrine in Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters. 38 The League of Women
Voters brought suit against the FCC to challenge section 399 of the Public
Broadcasting Act of 1967. This section prohibited any noncommercial educational broadcasting station that received a grant from the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting from editorializing. 39 The federal district court overturned the prohibition, stating that section 399 could survive constitutional
scrutiny only if it served a compelling governmental interest. 4°
31. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
32. Id. at 377; see also Canby, The First Amendment Right to Persuade. Access to Radio
and Television, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 723, 728 (1972) (author derives a right of public access to
broadcast media from goal of first amendment to provide diversity of public views); Comment,
The FairnessDoctrine. Protectionfor a Scarce PublicResource, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1083, 1094
(1983) (author defends fairness doctrine as enhancing public's first amendment rights).
33. 395 U.S. at 372-74; see Comment, supra note 32, at 1087-93.
34. 395 U.S. at 387. The broadcasters sought to be protected by the first amendment to
the same extent as publishers. Publishers are not required to give equal weight to opposing
views. Id.; see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). The Court
held Florida's right of reply statute, which granted political candidates equal space to answer
criticisms and attacks on their records by newspapers, unconstitutional under the first amendment. Id.
35. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
36. Id. at 393. The Court declared that "scarcity is not entirely a thing of the past." Id.
The development of new technology brought not only new ways to meet current demand but
also new demand. The Court cited conflicts between "vital functions" such as defense
preparedness and experimentation in methods of averting mid-air collisions through radio
warning devices. Id.
37. Id. at 395.
38. 104 S. Ct. 3106, 82 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1984).
39. Id. at 3111, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 283.
40. League of Women Voters v. FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379, 384 (C.D. Cal. 1982). The dis-
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First, the Supreme Court analyzed the standard of scrutiny appropriate
for broadcast media. The Court found the compelling governmental interest
standard inappropriate for broadcast regulation. 41 Citing Red Lion, the
Court stated that the differences between the print and broadcast media justified the application of different first amendment standards. 42 Thus,
although the district court's compelling standard applies to print media regulation, 43 courts may uphold broadcast regulation only when draftsmen
have "narrowly tailored [the regulations] to further a substantial governmental interest. ' "44 Second, a sharply divided Court 45 found that the government failed to meet the substantial governmental interest standard; thus, the

law violated public broadcasters' first amendment rights.46 The majority expressly based the substantial governmental interest 47 standard on the spec-

trum scarcity doctrine, 48 upholding the doctrine as one of the wellestablished fundamental principles guiding the Court in its evaluation of
broadcast regulation. 49 In a footnote the Court directly addressed the spectrum scarcity doctrine. Making the definitive statement on the status of the
doctrine today, the Court stated:

The prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on spectrum
scarcity has come under increasing criticism in recent years. Critics,
including the incumbent Chairman of the FCC, charge that with the
advent of cable and satellite television technology, communities now
have access to such a wide variety of stations that the scarcity doctrine
is obsolete ....

We are not prepared, however, to reconsider our long

trict court followed the compelling governmental interest standard usually applied to restrictions of speech regarding public issues, relying on nonbroadcast media cases that applied this
standard. Id.; see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (Massachusettes law
prohibiting certain corporations from making expenditures to influence votes of elected officials violated first amendment); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (Alabama law prohibiting the publishing of editorials on election day held unconstitutional).
41. 104 S. Ct. at 3115, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 289.
42. Id. at 3116, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 290. The Court restated the scarcity doctrine, citing
several cases. In FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 799-800
(1978), the Court reiterated the scarcity doctrine, upholding the FCC rule that barred common ownership of a newspaper and broadcasting stations in certain communities. In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1973), the
Court held that petitioners, the Democratic National Committee, did not have a right to disregard the FCC's fairness doctrine and purchase advertising time from broadcasters to publicize
its views on the Vietnam War.
43. 104 S. Ct. at 3115, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 289. The Court stated that expression of editorial
opinion on matters of public importance requires the most exacting degree of first amendment
protection and that an editorializing ban like § 399, if applied to the print media, would not
survive scrutiny. Id.
44. Id. at 3118, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 292.
45. Id. at 3106, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 283. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the Court, in
which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor joined. Justice Rehnquist filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice White joined. Justice Stevens
filed a separate dissenting opinion.
46. Id. at 3129, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 305-06.
47. Id. at 3118, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 292.
48. Id. at 3116, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 289-90.
49. Id. The three fundamental principles that guided the Court in evaluating the editorializing ban included the spectrum scarcity doctrine, the aim of providing balanced presentations over the broadcast media, and the protection of journalists' first amendment rights to the
fullest extent consistent with their public duties. Id.
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standing approach without some signal from Congress or the FCC that
some revision of
technological developments have advanced so far that
50
the system of broadcast regulation may be required.
II.

VIDEO TECHNOLOGIES

Two related but distinct assumptions form the basis for the spectrum scarcity doctrine. First, the doctrine assumes that broadcast media must operate
on the electromagnetic spectrum. 5 ' Second, the doctrine assumes that the
spectrum cannot be expanded by compressing more signals into the spectrum. 52 The first assumption ignores cable television, which offers video
services similar to ultrahigh frequency (UHF) or very high frequency (VHF)
television by sending a signal by wire rather than through the broadcast
spectrum. 53 The second assumption ignores the development of compression techniques, 54 which demonstrate the inherent flexibility of the electromagnetic spectrum. 55 The next section surveys the regulatory and technical
developments in the following areas of video technologies: cable television,
direct broadcast satellites, low power television, and the development of
techniques that will permit more efficient use of the broadcast spectrum.
A.

Cable Television

1. Regulation. The FCC began regulating cable television in the mid1960s. 56 From the mid-1960s until 1979 the FCC actively regulated the
cable industry to promote nationwide television service. 57 In 1979, however,
the Supreme Court limited the Commission's jurisdiction over cable television. 58 The Court struck down rules that required cable systems with more
than 3,500 subscribers to provide access channels, to provide two-way communications, and to increase the capacity of their services to twenty channels. 59 After 1979 the Commission allowed cable operators to carry distant
signals and syndicated programs. 60 Today the FCC rules prohibit duplica50. Id. at 3116, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 289.
51. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389; National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 218.
52. The spectrum scarcity doctrine implicitly assumes the impossibility of spectrum expansion. Application of technology, however, can multiply the number of channels in the
spectrum. See I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 7, at 151-54; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at
222.
53. See Stem, supra note 8, at 551.
54. See I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 7, at 152-54. Multiplexing, compression, and subcarrier operations are methods of providing more than one service at a time over the same
spectrum allocation. Id.
55. For one author's description of methods to multiply channels, see id.
56. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1030 (8th Cir. 1978), affid, 440 U.S. 689
(1979). The court found that FCC cable rules that required mandatory channel capacity,
equipment, and access to the public exceeded the Commission's jurisdiction. 571 F.2d at 1030;
see Stern, supra note 8, at 567-68.
57. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 1978), afl'd, 440 U.S. 689
(1979); Stern, supra note 8, at 567.
58. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
59. Id.
60. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 813-15
(1980); see Stem, supra note 8, at 568.
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tion of network and sports programs, 61 protect cable system operators from
exhorbitant franchise fees, 62 and require cable systems to carry local broadcast signals. 63 The Commission's rules of equal time, fairness, and obscenity
64
apply to those cable systems that engage in the origination of cablecasting.
2. Cable Technology and its Application. Commentators attribute cable television's rapid growth to improvements in technology. 65 Refinements in
cable technology have increased the capacity of a single cable to fifty-two
channels. 66 The development of fiber optics promises further improvements
in the efficiency and quality of cable services. 6 7 Presently approximately
5,800 operating cable systems exist in America, with another 1,939
franchises approved but not yet built. 68 Although most systems carry twelve
channels, systems constructed after March 1972 must carry a minimum of
twenty channels. 69 One estimate states that cable reaches perhaps 95 million
people, representing approximately70 forty percent of the households in the
United States that have television.
B. Direct Broadcast Satellites
Direct broadcast satellite (DBS) video delivery systems make use of signals transmitted from earth to high-powered geostationary satellites (direct
broadcast satellites). The direct broadcast satellite then transmits television
signals to individual homes equipped with a disk to receive them. 7 1 These
signals reach even remote areas inaccessible to conventional UHF and VHF
broadcast signals.
1. Regulation. The Federal Communications Commission issued interim
regulations for DBS -service in 1982.72 The interim rules sought to create
two regulatory categories for DBS owners: broadcasters and programmercustomers. Broadcasters who retained control over the content of their DBS
transmissions received the same treatment as national broadcasters under
61. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.67, .92 (1984).
62. Id. § 76.31.
63. Id. §§ 76.57, .59, .61.
64. Id. §§ 76.205, .209, .215. Because cablecasters are brought under the fairness and
equal access regulations, the discussion of the first amendment rights of those who run video
delivery systems in the conclusion of this Comment, infra notes 167-74 and accompanying
text, applies to cablecasters. These rules seem open to constitutional attack because they have
no basis in the spectrum scarcity doctrine. Cablecasting utilizes wire instead of the electromagnetic spectrum.
65. Stern, supra note 8, at 551.
66. Id. Future estimates of cable capacity run as high as 200 channels per cable line. Id.
67. Id. at 554.
68. NATIONAL Ass'N OF BROADCASTERS, supra note 10, at D-3.
69. Id.
70. Id. Approximately 3,250 cable systems produce and cablecast from their own studios.
Id. The number of people in the United States served by cable increased from 16 million in
1980 to 25 million in 1983. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, at 563.
71. For an excellent discussion of the technology and future importance of DBS, see National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1195-97 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
72. Id. at 1197. The interim rules created the DBS broadcast service. Id. Direct Broadcast Satellites Report & Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982) [hereinafter cited as DBS Order].
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the FCC rules. 73 The FCC rules applicable to broadcasters require that
broadcasters provide reply time to federal political candidates 74 and provide
access to federal political candidates during their campaigns. 75 The rules
allow a DBS owner to choose to act as a common carrier instead of as a
broadcaster. 76 The DBS common carrier must offer the services of his DBS
77
indiscriminately to the public.
Another category created by the rules, programmer-customers, also falls
within common carrier rules. 78 Programmer-customers lease, rather than
own, DBS satellites from common carrier owners and send programming via
DBS satellite to individual homes. 79 As the originator of programming the
80
programmer-customer retains control of the DBS signal.
In NationalAssociation of Broadcasters v. Federal Communications Commission8 l the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed the interim rules in part, but struck down that part of the order that
exempted customer-programmers from the access and equal time doctrines
found in the Broadcasting Act.8 2 The court found that the Commission departed from it statutory mandate by exempting common carriers from the
regulatory constraints that Congress had chosen to impose on broadcasters
to protect the public interest.8 3 The court, however, upheld the remaining
interim rules, including an exemption for DBS owners from the Commission's rules that bar ownership of more than seven television stations and
ownership of an interest in stations that have overlapping broadcast areas.8 4
The Commission has yet to issue permanent rules.
2. DBS Technology and Its Application. DBS video service, not yet operating but projected to begin in the near future, utilizes powerful geostationary
satellites that transmit directly to small, inexpensive earth terminals.8 5 Direct broadcast satellites send signals up to forty times more powerful than
communications satellites in use today.8 6 A two-foot wide dish in the back
73. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
DBS Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 708 (1982).
74. See DBS Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 709 (1982) (imposing 47 U.S.C. § 315 on DBS
systems). The equal time doctrine, which applies to all broadcasters, requires equal access to
air time for qualified candidates for federal office. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§ 315 (1982). The fairness doctrine, on the other hand, requires a balanced presentation of
controversial issues of public interest. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1984).
75. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982).
76. DBS Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 708-09 (1982).
77. Id. at 708-11.
78. See id.
79. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1984); DBS
Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 708-11 (1982).
80. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1984); DBS
Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 708-11 (1982).
81. 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
82. Id. at 1222. For a discussion of the access and equal time doctrines promulgated by
the Communications Act of 1934, see supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
83. 740 F.2d at 1200-03.
84. Id. at 1208.
85. E. DIAMOND, supra note 7, at 44-46; Stern, supra note 8, at 541.
86. Stern, supra note 8, at 541-44.

19851

COMMENT

yard will enable individual users of the service to receive DBS transmissions.8 7 The FCC has granted conditional construction permits for eight
DBSs. 88 Each DBS system will eventually be capable of providing as many
as three channels to each of the nation's time zones. 89 Since a single DBS
signal will eventually reach the entire continental United States, DBS video
systems rank superior to current broadcast delivery systems. 90 The eventual
uses and applications of DBS technology could provide the future telecommunications market with its most significant broadcast tool. 9 1
C. Low-Power Television
Low-power television uses vacant UHF and VHF channels to broadcast at
lower power levels. 92 The technology to broadcast at lower power levels
prohibited a loworiginated in the 1950s. Prior to 1982, however, FCC rules
93
power station from originating its own programming.
The new low-power television rules, promulgated in 1982, 9 4 permit lowpower stations to originate programming, broadcast prerecorded tapes or
movies, and transmit broadcast signals received from a distant source, such
as from a satellite. 95 As of 1983, the FCC had received 7,900 applications
for low-power television stations under the new rules. 96 The applications
exhibited great diversity, including proposals for sports, news, religious, public affairs, and minority-oriented programming. 97 The economic entry barrier to low-power television broadcasting is much smaller than for
conventional television broadcasting. The low-power station can cost as little as $50,000; conventional stations, on the other hand, cost $1,000,000 or
98
more.
D.

Technology Allowing More Efficient Use of the Broadcast Spectrum

In addition to cable and DBS technologies, technologies to utilize more
efficiently the electromagnetic broadcast spectrum are emerging. 99 Two
87. Id. at 542.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1195 (DBS capable of providing channels over the entire continental United States). Circuit Judge Mikva provides an excellent description of the workings of DBS. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. Stern, supra note 8, at 538.
93. Id. at 539-40.
94. Low-Power Television Service, 51 RAD. REG. 2D (P & F) 476, 476 (1982).
95. See 47 C.F.R. § 74.731 (1984). Id. §§ 74.701-.784 contain regulations governing lowpower television and television translator stations.
96. Stern, supra note 8, at 539.
97. Id. Among the applicants are the Citizen Television System, backed by Ralph Nader;
Neighborhood Television, an affiliate of Sears, Roebuck & Co., which has proposed a system of

low-power stations to show country-western and rural programs; and the United Auto Workers. Id.
98. Stern, supra note 8, at 540. While a low-power station costs much less than a conventional UHF or VHF station, it has a correspondingly smaller range. Current limitations on the
power levels of the low-broadcast station limit its reach to a twenty-mile area. Id.
99. I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 7, at 152-54; Stern, supra note 8, at 560-61.
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technologies, digital transmission and compression, seek to add channels to
the available electromagnetic spectrum. 1° ° Digital techniques, currently
under development by AT&T, ITT, and others, convert audio and video
signals from analog "wave" form to on-off impulses. 0 1 Digital transmission
permits the spectrum to carry several signals across the frequency range now
used for one television signal.' 0 2 Compression techniques utilize a coding
scheme that encodes a transmission into less information, which correspondingly requires less space on the frequency. 0 3 Although still in its infancy,
compression technology could make rapid progress with proper funding.o4
The application of this technology, although multiplying the number of
channels on the spectrum, remains quite expensive.105
Although admittedly in early stages of development, both digital and
compression techniques should prove significant. These new technologies
demonstrate that the electromagnetic spectrum can potentially carry two,
four, even eight or more channels in the space it takes to carry one television
signal today.10 6 Indeed, the advent of this technology brings into question
0 7
one of the basic assumptions of the spectrum scarcity doctrine.1

III.

RESULTANT CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE

Today the Supreme Court uses the spectrum scarcity doctrine as the principal constitutional justification for applying a less stringent standard of review to alleged encroachments on the first amendment rights of broadcasters
as compared with the publishers of print media.' 08 Extensive deregulation
of cable has occurred.' 09 The FCC promulgated comparatively little regulation of direct broadcast satellites. 10 The regulations requiring fairness on
public issues and equal time for political candidates apply, however, to con2
ventional VHF and UHF television, " ' DBS, 11 and cable. 113
The Court appears to have accepted and developed the spectrum scarcity
doctrine based on a factual conclusion regarding the nature of broadcast
communication.' "4 The view that the electromagnetic spectrum is very limited springs from assumptions of outdated technology. Modern technologies
100. I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 7, at 154.
101. Stern, supra note 8, at 560-61.
102. Id.
103. See I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 7, at 153-54.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 154. The deregulation of the broadcast industry could provide the economic
incentive for the rapid development of these techniques. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7,

at 222 ("[t]echnology is an independent variable that makes scarcity a relative concept").
106. See I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 7, at 154; Stem, supra note 8, at 560-61.
107. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 218, clearly sets forth the assumption that the

number
108.
109.
110.

of radio channels is limited by natural forces.
League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3115-16, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 288-89.
See supra text accompanying notes 56-63.
See supra text accompanying notes 71-84.

111. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.

112. See supra text accompanying note 82.
113. See supra text accompanying note 64.
114. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
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disprove these assumptions. 1 5
With the development of DBS, digital techniques, compression techniques, and low-power television, actual scarcity on the broadcast spectrum
will soon disappear. 116 The development and application of cable technology relieves the electromagnetic spectrum of the burden of carrying many
and varied video channels. Even the relative scarcity of the conventional
broadcast spectrum has little significance for the home viewer who also has
7
access to cable."1
The current number of broadcast outlets far exceeds the number of circulated daily newspapers. 1 8 Almost all cities have at least three major television stations, whereas an average of only one of twenty-five cities has
competing daily newspapers. 119 Considering the number of channels presently available and the additional channels that will become available
through technological advances, 120 one may conclude that the scarcity on
which the doctrine was based no longer exists, at least from the perspective
of the user.'21
The Court uses the term spectrum scarcity to mean that the demand for
broadcast licenses exceeds the supply. 122 An excess demand for economically valuable free licenses would not surprise an economist. Such demand
would occur whenever the government offered a cost-free income-producing
license.1 23 As one writer has observed, if the government created a commission to allocate cost-free newsprint to those who served the public interest,
but restricted sales to others, a situation of scarcity of newsprint would result. 124 In this sense scarcity describes a condition created in part by the
government's displacement of market forces.12 5 In a market in which modem technology has provided television users with many video channels, the
115. See I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 7, at 151-88.
116. See Bazelon, supra note 6, at 207. Judge Bazelon states that advances in technology
offer the promise of virtually unlimited access to the living room. Id.
117. See I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 7, at 155-56; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 226.
FCC Chairman Fowler states that in locations where new high capacity cable systems are in
operation, no scarcity exists in the television spectrum. Id. Implicit in this statement lies the
assumption that UHF and VHF constitute methods of delivery in one large home television
market, not separate markets. The assumption has merit.
118. Powe, supra note 7, at 56.
119. Id. at 57. This statistic gains importance if one assumes less scarcity in a market of
high inter-media competition.
120. The scarcity concept can no longer justify the lower standard of review that applies to
alleged encroachments on the first amendment rights of publishers. See Fowler, supra note 7,
at 523-28.
121. Professor Powe states that "[tihe principal barrier to market entry, whether print or
broadcast, is economic." Powe, supra note 7, at 57.
122. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (Court
upheld affirmative statutory right of reasonable access to use of broadcast stations to candidates for federal office); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-90 (Court upheld obligation under fairness
doctrine to provide reply time).
123. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 221-22; Powe, supra note 7, at 57.
124. Powe, supra note 7, at 57-58.
125. Stern, supra note 8, at 562. The authors state that the FCC television allocation plan
has perpetuated spectrum scarcity, citing NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS:
ERSHIP AND REGULATION 14-30 (Oct. 1980).
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scarcity that results from governmental regulation cannot justify artificial
restrictions on the video market. The critics of the scarcity doctrine have
proposed alternative justifications for the regulation of the broadcast industry. 126 The incumbent chairman of the Federal Communications Commission has made perhaps the most important proposal,
27

to base new

broadcasting regulations on a marketplace approach.

SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

IV.

A.

The Market Approach

The leading proponent of the marketplace approach to broadcast regula-

12
tion is Federal Communications Commission Chairman Mark Fowler. 8
Chairman Fowler has proposed a regulatory scheme radically different from
the one currently in place.129 The market proposal would make broadcast
licenses freely transferable. 130 Ways to apply this approach include lottery or
3
granting existing holders of licenses the new freely transferable license.' '
The market approach seeks to deliver the broadcast license into the hands of
would also relax current rethe highest value user. 132 The Fowler proposal
133

strictions on multiple ownership of stations.

The FCC currently limits the number of media outlets through multiple
ownership rules. 134 The multiple ownership rules bar a person from being a
stockholder, officer, or director in more than seven broadcast stations of the
same broadcast service. 135 A person having an interest in eight AM radio
stations would violate the rules, whereas a person owning seven AM, seven
eliminate
FM, and seven TV stations would not. The FCC has proposed to136
the multiple ownership rules under its market approach scheme.
Although the FCC's totally hands-off approach does guarantee the broadcaster freedom from unconstitutional abridgements of his right to free
126. See infra text accompanying notes 128-46.
127. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 242-56.
128. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3116, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 289.
129. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 242-56.
130. Id. at 242-44; see E. DIAMOND, supra note 7, at 57-109. The author of this section of
the book discusses the economic and regulatory theory of the marketplace approach to broadcast regulation.
131. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 242-43.
132. See id. at 209-10. FCC Chairman Fowler argues that the FCC should rely on the
individual broadcaster to ascertain the needs of the public through normal market forces. Id.
133. Id. at 245-46. The Fowler proposal also calls for the abandonment of the fairness
doctrine and political speech rules, although he concedes that the FCC might assign access
obligations for political candidates and political referenda. Id.
134. In re Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules and Regulations
Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations. Report and
Order, 18 F.C.C. 288, 294-95 (1953).
135. Id. at 295-97. The rules are often called the 7/7/7 rules. Comment, An Alternative
Proposal to the FCC's Proposed Amendment: Broadcast Media Concentration Rules, 14
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 399, 400 n.7 (1984).
136. In re Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules
Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, General
Docket No. 83-1009. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Adopted September 22, 1983: Released: October 20, 1983, 49 Fed. Reg. 49438 (1983). Comment, supra note 135, at 401 n.13.
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speech, the Commission would allow a concentration of ownership in media
outlets. 137 If one individual owned the media outlets in a given market, that
person could monopolize the channels of political speech. 138 This concentration of influence in the hands of a few has the real potential of limiting the
diversity of views that a citizen can hear.139 Although the spectrum scarcity
doctrine rests on an outmoded technical assumption, this fact does not emasculate its constitutional premise that the first amendment seeks to provide a
free marketplace of ideas. 140
B.

The StructuralApproach

The structural approach to broadcast regulation seeks to promote diversity through non-content-based regulations.' 4 ' Under this approach the
FCC does not analyze the content of the speech, but focuses on and limits
the structure of the ownership and control of the media. 142 The FCC now
has a rule that uses the structural approach by requiring that those who seek
to own or control both newspaper and broadcast outlets divest themselves of
43
the broadcast outlet.1
Presently the courts and the FCC primarily regulate television as a product sub-market in a national geographic market. Television constitutes but
one competing media delivery system. The courts and the FCC, therefore,
should expand the media product market to include TV, radio, newspaper,
and possibly other sources and should seek to narrow the geographic market
to appropriate metropolitan regions. 144 Because all of these media have an
impact on a viewer in any one market, this approach would necessitate an
analysis of the ownership or control of all media outlets in any market. 145
One commentator suggests that the FCC borrow the rules of antitrust law as
a methodology to hold a case of media concentration unlawful. 146
Although an interesting and worthwhile proposal, the antitrust methodology and its eventual application to media regulation may prove quite costly
and difficult. As threshold questions, the courts would necessarily address
137. See Note, Old Wine in New Bottles: Replacing the Fairness Doctrine with Enforced
Competition in the Media, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT 143 (1984).
138. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 23 (1945) (newspaper wire service not
immune from antitrust laws).
139. Note, supra note 137, at 143.
140. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (regulations requiring access for political candidates would
ensure that the public receives opposing political views). For a discussion of how antitrust
actions by the Federal Trade Commission may also ensure the broadcast of opposing political
views, see infra notes 141-46.
141. See Bazelon, supra note 6, at 209. Where Judge Bazelon refers to content-based regulations he points to those that require the FCC to evaluate the content of programming such as
the fairness doctrine. Id. at 206.
142. Id. at 209.
143. In re Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules
Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 50
F.C.C.2d 1046, 1099-1106 (1975), af'd sub nom. FCC v. National Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); see Note, supra note 137, at 145.
144. Id. at 143-52.
145. Id.
146. See id.
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the proper identification of the geographic and product markets. The antitrust burdens of per se and rule-of-reason analysis would complicate the regulatory problem, especially in the application of such market identification
and analyses to difficult first amendment issues. Although a profitable tool
for analysis, a wholesale adaptation of antitrust rules into the regulation of
media appears too costly and uncertain to be an attractive substitute for the
present system.
In adopting the structural approach, the FCC should make the rules simple to understand and inexpensive to administer. The rule against the ownership of more than seven outlets of the same media service exemplifies such
a rule. A rule numerically limiting the ownership of multiple media outlets
in one media market, although not ideal, would serve as a measure of protection against the monopolization of the media outlets.
C. Other ConstitutionalJustificationsfor Applying Different First
Amendment Standards to the Video Media
The equal time doctrine and the fairness doctrine apply to VHF, UHF,
cable, and DBS. 147 The Supreme Court in League of Women Voters 148 recently explained that the constitutional basis of these regulations is the spectrum scarcity doctrine. Congress does have the plenary authority under the
commerce clause to regulate the video marketplace. 149 The fairness doctrine
and the reply doctrine, embodied in the Communication Act, restrain free
speech and therefore come into tension with the first amendment., 50 Once
the Court recognizes that the spectrum scarcity doctrine has lost its factual
basis, the Court logically must either overturn these provisions or find a new
constitutional basis. 151
An examination of the Court's treatment of the same regulation applied to
the print media demonstrates the tension between the equal time doctrine
and the first amendment. The equal time doctrine requires that broadcast
stations give equal air time to all bona fide candidates for public office. 152 A
unanimous Court in Miami HeraldPublishingCo. v. Tornillo153 struck down
a Florida statute granting a political candidate's right to reply. The Court
found the statute's requirement an impermissible infringement on the news
judgment of newspaper editors.1 5 4 In stark contrast to this approach, Red
Lion "5' 5 upholds the similar FCC fairness doctrine on the basis of the spec56
trum scarcity.'
147.
148.
149.
150.

See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
104 S. Ct. at 3116, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 289.

Id.
See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 697 (Professor Tribe notes the juxtaposition of the

Court's treatment of the first amendment rights of broadcasters and publishers); Bazelon,
supra note 6, at 204.
151. See Fowler, supra note 7, at 525-27.

152. See supra note 74; Powe, supra note 7, at 50-51.
153. 418 U.S. 241, 242 (1974).

154. Id. at 258.
155. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
156. Id. at 389.
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1. Impact Theory. The Court also supports a less stringent standard for
regulations affecting first amendment rights of broadcasters, 57 on the prem15 8
ise that broadcast has a pervasive impact on the lives of all Americans.
This rationale correlates to the power theory. The power theory postulates
that because the broadcast medium is the source of a majority of America's
news, regulation must ensure that it promote the common good. 159 The impact theory conflicts with the holding in Tornillo,16° in which the Court took
pains to discuss and reject the power or impact theory for the print media.1 61
To justify broadcast regulation on the basis of the impact theory the court
must find broadcast media more persuasive than print media.
The conclusion that broadcast media has more impact than print media
requires the finding of several facts, including a finding that the broadcast
media has a major role in shaping human behavior. This conclusion rightly
belongs to the fields of psychology or physiology. Because the impact theory
looks to the political influence of the broadcaster, the Court must also determine the political and social influence of the broadcaster's audience as opposed to the readers of print. To determine the political influence of the
viewing audience, the researcher must determine the number of viewers who
are actual or potential voters. Future advances in the fields of psychology,
demographics, and political science may threaten the currently accurate factual foundation of any constitutional impact doctrine.
2. First Amendment Goal of Diversity of Views. Judge Bazelon and others
have suggested that in addition to protecting free speech, the first amendment seeks to contribute to a diversity of political dialogue. 1 62 The first
amendment seeks to create an uninhibited market place of ideas, 163 according to this view. 64 The Court in Red Lion explicitly adopted this rationale
157. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In this case the Court upheld the FCC's
informal sanction of a radio station resulting from the playing of a humorous monologue containing offensive words at 2:00 p.m. The Court noted that the broadcast media has a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of Americans and found the first amendment rights of the audience superior to those of the broadcasters. Id. at 748.

158. Id.; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 227-28; Powe, supra note 7, at 58-60.
159. Powe, supra note 7, at 58-60.
160. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Court found
Florida's right to reply statute that grants a political candidate the right to equal space to
answer a newspaper's criticism and attacks on his record unconstitutional. Id. at 258.

161. The Florida Supreme Court, from which this case was appealed, held that free speech
was enhanced and not abridged by the statute because it furthered the "broad societal interest
in the free flow of information to the public." Tomillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287
So. 2d 78, 82 (Fla. 1973). The State of Florida argued on appeal that the right of reply statute

was necessary to correct abuses that would be the natural result of "vast accumulations of
unreviewable power in the modem media empires."

Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 250. The Court

implicitly rejected this argument, holding that the statute violated the first amendment rights
of print editors. Id. at 258.
162. Bazelon, supra note 6, at 203. This goal is served by the first amendment's prohibition
on the federal government from suppressing unpopular views. Id.

163. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
164. Commentators have construed this aim of the first amendment as providing an affirmative right of access to the media. This "right to persuade" over the airwaves is discussed in
the following articles: Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.

L.

REV.

1641 (1967); Canby, supra note 32, at 736-39; Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine
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for broadcast regulation.1 6 5 The fairness doctrine withstood constitutional
attack because the Court adopted this theory to justify an infringement into
166
the editorial function of broadcasters.
V.

CONCLUSION

In 1984 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the spectrum scarcity doctrine in
League of Women Voters. 167 Although noting that the doctrine has come
under criticism, the Court declined to reconsider its long-standing approach
without some signal from Congress or the FCC. That signal would tell the
Court that technological developments have advanced enough to justify
some revision of broadcast regulation. 68 In light of the stinging criticism of
the doctrine by FCC Chairman Fowler 69 and FCC proposals to Congress
for broadcast regulation reform, 170 that the Court did not consider the
71
FCC's position is troubling.'
The Court's footnote 11 from League of Women Voters evades the point.
Without the spectrum scarcity rationale the fairness and equal time doctrine
lose their constitutional justification. 72 A unanimous Court in Tornillo considered and rejected the impact and diversity of views arguments that the
State of Florida sought to apply to the print media.' 73 The Court could
support the equal time and fairness doctrines by concluding that broadcasters have more impact than publishers on the public.174 This rationale does
not justify encroaching upon the free speech rights of broadcasters. The
in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REV. 1
(1973).
165. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
166. The Court in Red Lion held the interest of the government to ensure a fair representation of views paramount to the right of broadcasters to exclude whomever they wished from
access to their radio frequencies. Id. at 389. The Court embraced the view that the first
amendment should promote a diversity of views, with the now famous words: "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it
be by the Government itself or a private licensee." Id. at 390.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 38-50.
168. 104 S. Ct. at 3116, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 289.
169. See Fowler, supra note 7, at 523-28.
170. The FCC proposed a package of legislative reforms in 1981. The FCC believes that
these reforms could be adopted without changing the Communications Act. These reforms are
known as Track I and Track II. Track I recommended implementation of the market approach by lottery and was introduced in H.R. 5008, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982). Track II
advocated the elimination of the doctrine of fairness and political speech rules and was introduced in H.R. 5584 and H.R. 5585, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Fowler & Brenner, supra
note 7, at 242 n.155.
171. FCC Chairman Fowler obviously would not have agreed with the government position in League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3106, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 278.
172. See supra text accompanying note 151.
173. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 247-58.
174. One commentator has reported that his review of the original research on the persuasive power of television reveals that television's power in shaping American's beliefs and opinions has limits. He hypothesizes that the potential power of television flows from its ability to
further persuade segments of society who need little persuasion, rather than create new opinions. See Powe, supra note 7, at 59.
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accuracy of the impact rationale today may have little to do with circumstances twenty or fifty years from now.
When the Court bases a constitutional doctrine on a factual conclusion
based on evolving technology, that doctrine will eventually become outmoded. Congress sought to regulate broadcasting in 1934. In 1945 the Court
upheld the Communications Act of 1934 against a first amendment challenge, based on the spectrum scarcity rationale. The factual basis for this
doctrine has disappeared. This conclusion will prove quite obvious when
new technology brings DBS and the compression techniques into the marketplace. Congress may retain into the foreseeable future provisions of the
Communications Act such as the equal time and political speech requirements. If the Court seeks to uphold these provisions it must look beyond the
outmoded spectrum scarcity doctrine. The Court should apply a constitutional principle unwedded to factual conclusions about the rapidly developing technological capacity of modern industry.

